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The British Columbia 
Model 
The funding of legal services has been a major 
problem since the inception of legal aid programs. The 
problem today remains severe: President Nixon is in the 
process of attempting to disman tie the Office of Economic 
Opportunity, while legislation to create an independent 
legal services corporation has thus far been frustrated. 1 And 
widespread political opposition on the state and local levels 
remains.2 The need for innovative methods of funding legal 
services is clear. 
This article will propose a scheme for funding 
·1egal services which has received little attention in this 
country. The discussion is based on a plan which has been 
in operation in British Columbia since 1970. The funding 
plan will be introduced, described, and then analyzed 
chiefly in terms of the practical, ethical, legal and political 
problems that might arise by implementation of such a plan 
in this country. 
Norman Mueller 
1 The British Columbia Model 
The basiC feature of the funding method now in 
operation in British Columbia is the interest-bearing clients' 
trust fund. 3 Cli~nts' trust funds consist of those monies 
paid to attorneys by clients which the attorneys, in turn, 
pay out on behalf of the client. During the varying periods 
of time these monies are held by the attorneys as trustees 
for clients, they are deposited in trust accounts, to be paid 
out for a wide variety of purposes: payments in connection 
with mortgages, contracts, the settlement of tort suits or 
anti-trust actions, and court costs. 
The clients' trust fund, then, is a device which 
facilitates the practice of law. A lawyer very often desires 
quick access to his client's funds because it is often hard to 
predict when a transaction will be completed or a 
settlement reached. Immediate access to a client's funds is 
often crucial to the conclusion of a transaction, because the 
lawyer is able to guarantee immediate payment. 
It is evident that attorneys handle clients' 
monies for a wide range of purposes and that the length of 
time which a particular client's money is ii;i. the possession 
of the attorney may vary from a period of a few days to 
many months. It is common practice in the United States 
for an attorney to place his clients' monies in a non-
interest-bearing demand account where they can easily be 
withdrawn when the attorney needs to make payments on 
behalf of the client. Exceptions are made in the case of the 
corporate or individual client who pays large amounts to 
the lawyer or whose money will not be paid out for a 
length of time. In these cases, the lawyer will usually put 
the money in a separate interest-bearing account, with the 
interest being paid to the client. Here, the interest income 
to the client is substantial enough to justify the special 
arrangement made by the lawyer on his behalf. 
The potential value of the pooled clients' trust 
account is obvious. While the time differential between 
client pay-in and lawyer pay-out may be short for a 
particular client and the sum involved may be small, over 
time the aggregate sum of clients' monies in the account 
remains more or less constant. This sum is a potential 
source of substantial interest. 
In the past, in British Columbia, the clients' 
trust account has been permitted to be interest-earning; 
since 1972 it is required by law to be interest-bearing.4 A 
statute passed in 1969 in British Columbia provides for the 
use of this ea~ned interest in law-related areas, including 
financing of legal aid programs. 
The British Columbia statute creates a 
corporation catled the Law Foundation5 to which is paid 
the interest earned on clients' trust funds. The system 
established is voluntary on the part of the client, permitting 
a client who does not wish to participate to make an 
agreement with the attorney to put the client's funds in a 
separate account, with the interest accruing to the client. 6 
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Otherwise the clients' funds go into the pooled trust 
account which earns interest credited to the attorney. 7 It is 
then the responsibility of the attorney to remit this interest 
to the foundation. 8 
The Law Foundation is administered by a 
28l seven-member Board of Governors. 9 This governing panel 
has virtually complete discretion in the use of funds 
accumulated by the Law Foundation. The statute does 
mandate the maintenance of "a fund to be used for the 
purposes of legal education, legal research, legal aid, law 
reform, and the establishment, operation, and maintenance 
of law libraries." 10 But within these parameters the Board 
has total discretion in the application of funds. 11 The 
Board of Governors, as trustee, may invest the foundation 
funds in order to raise more capital. And the Board also has 
the power to draft by-laws 12 to provide for the operation 
of the foundation, the designation of officers and 
employees, and salaries. 
The economic feasibility of such a funding 
scheme in this country depends on such factors as the 
number of lawyers participating and the size of their 
clients' trust funds; whether the plan is enacted on a 
national, state, or local level; and finally, the amount of 
money required to finance the particular legal services 
program. All of these factors will have to be analyzed in the 
context of the facts of specific cases. But the experience in 
. British Columbia is encouraging. Until November, 1972, 
participation on the part of lawyers was voluntary. An 
approximate 30% participation in both 1971 and 1972 
netted $200,000 a year for the Foundation. And although 
·legal aid is only one of five purposes of the Foundation, it 
received approximately $100,000 in each of those years. 13 
Participation is now mandatory 14 for lawyers and this 
should substantially increase the amount of funds flowing 
to the Law Foundation. 
At first blush, then, the application of such a 
scheme to a state in this country seems simple: put clients' 
trust funds in an interest-bearing account, have that interest 
paid to a foundation, and then have the foundation fund a 
legal services program. But upon closer examination it 
becomes evident that serious obstacles exist to such an 
application. First, the possibility exists that such a funding 
scheme would be interpreted as in violation of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility. Secondly, existing banking 
regulations which effectively prohibit interest-bearing 
demand accounts constitute a major hurdle in the 
implementation of such a scheme. Finally, objections of 
constitutional dimensions can be raised by the claim that 
the proposed funding scheme constitutes the taking of 
property without due process of law. 
2 The Possible Ethical Problem: 
The Code of Professional Responsibility 
Historically, the Canons of Ethics governing the 
conduct of attorneys has proscribed the commingling of 
clients' funds with the funds of the attorney. Also 
proscribed has been the use by attorneys of interest earned 
on clients' funds. These standards regulating the handling of 
clients' funds could hamper implementation of the 
proposed funding scheme. 
The Code of Professional Responsibility, 
adopted on August 12, 1969, by the American Bar 
Association and effective on January 1, 1970, delineates 
the standard of conduct to be adhered to by those engaged 
in the practice of law. The relevant parts of the Code 
dealing with clients' trust funds provide only that there be 
no commingling of clients' money with an attorney's 
money. 15 While this is the only explicit mandate of the 
Code of Professional Responsibility regarding clients' trust 
funds and would appear to present no barrier to the 
implementation of the proposed funding scheme it must be 
remembered that the Code is new and lacking in authorita- . 
tive interpretation. It will be helpful in determining the · 
possible scope of the Code's provisions on clients' trust 
funds to look at the Canons of Professional Ethics which 
were adopted in 1908 and continued in effect until 
replaced by the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
Canon 11 of the Canons of Professional Ethics 
provides in part: 
· Money of the client or collected for the client 
or other trust property coming intc the 
possession of the lawyer should be reported and 
accounted for promptly, and should not under 
any circumstances be commingled with his own 
or be used by him. 
On May 5, 1962, the Standing Committee on 
Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association 
rendered Informal Opinion #545. This opinion held that 
there would be a violation of Canon 11 if a client's money 
were placed in an interest-bearing account and the interest 
earned by that account was kept by the lawyer for his own 
use. Later that same year, on November 26, the committee 
ruled in Informal Opinion #621 that Canon 11 makes it 
"mandatory upon the lawyer to maintain a separate trust 
account for trust funds in his possession." On July 3, 1967, 
in Informal Opinion #991, the Committee reaffirmed its 
absolute stand against interest being earned on clients' trust 
accounts and being used by attorneys. In that opinion the 
Committee ruled that interest earned on clients' trust funds 
could not even be used to pay the expense of maintaining 
the trust account. 
The requirements under the Canons of 
Professional Ethics with regard to clients' trust funds were 
thus quite clear. Clients' trust funds were to be kept 
separate from the attorney's accounts. There was to be no 
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commingling of funds whereby the separate identity of the 
funds would be lost, in which case they could be subject to 
use for the attorney's personal expenses or be subject to 
claims of his creditors. And no interest was to be earned on 
the clients' trust account for use by the attorney. 
The Code of Professional Responsibility has 
dropped the wording 'used by him' and thus seems to 
establish a less strict standard than Canon 11. It is possible 
that the ABA Opinions just discussed are now obsolete. 16 
But it can be argued that the opinions should remain in 
effect as long as they are not inconsistent with the wording 
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. But even if the 
opinions are held to be consistent with the new wording of 
the Code of Professional Responsibility there would still 
appear to be no real difficulty. As in the British Columbia 
plan, the clients' funds being used to earn interest would 
not be in use for the benefit of the lawyer. Although the 
interest would be credited to the lawyer, it would not be 
for his use. Rather, the use of the interest, and thus of the 
funds, would be for the benefit of the foundation. 
The argument could be advanced that use of 
the clients' funds for the benefit of the foundation involves 
an ethical problem. The Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, however, says nothing about the use of clients' funds 
except that the funds are not to be put in a position where 
they might be depleted. Placing the funds in an interest-
bearing account separate from the attorney's accounts does 
not so endanger the clients' monies. This fact, plus the fact 
that such use ·of the funds would be authorized by a 
legislature, seems to indicate that if there is a problem here, 
it involves due process, rather than ethical considerations of 
the bar. Those due process problems will be discussed in a 
later section. 
3 The Mechanical Problems: Some Banking Law 
The major hurdle in the implementation of the 
British Columbia funding scheme in the United States, 
whether on the national or state level, appears to be the 
banking regulations which relate to interest-bearing demand 
accounts. The type of account essential for use in the 
proposed funding scheme, is, of course, the interest-bearing 
demand account. It must be a demand account to serve the 
purpose of a clients' trust fund; that is, a lawyer must have 
quick access to the client's monies, so that he may pay out 
those monies on behalf of the client when necessary. And 
the account must earn interest, for it is this factor which is 
at the heart of the funding scheme. 
Banking regulations in the United States 
effectively prohibit interest-bearing demand accounts in 
most commercial banks. They also make the use of savings 
banks inconvenient and thus impractical. The hurdle 
imposed by such regulations is formidable but does not 
constitute an absolute bar to the proposed funding scheme. 
An examination of these regulations in comparison with the 
situation in British Columbia, will hopefully show that the 
hurdle can be overcome, albeit not without some difficulty. 
Banking in Canada is subject exclusively to 
federal law. 17 The federal government has assumed a 
benevolent attitude toward banking while attempting to 
establish an economically powerful banking system that can 
compete favorably with other financial institutions. 18 The 
result has been a paucity of regulation on banking as banks 
are permitted to perform such business "as pertains to the 
business of banking." 19 
In Canada, there is no restriction on the 
amount of interest that banks can charge their customers or 
pay their creditors. The lack of regulation in this area 
means that the two essential criteria of the clients' trust 
account-that they be demand accounts and that they be 
interest-bearing-can be fulfilled without any statutory 
authorization. There is no federal regulation on what type 
of accounts can bear what rate of interest. And there are no 
conflicting provincial regulations to confront. The demand 
for interest-bearing demand accounts is created by the Law 
Foundation statute, and there is no regulation or restriction 
on the market to prevent it from fulfilling that demand. 
It is a different story in the United States. 
Banking is strictly regulated by the federal government and 
states impose varying degrees of additional regulations. 
State and national commercial banks as well as savings 
banks are regulated on both the federal and state levels. At 
first blush, these regulations appear to limit drastically the 
number of banks capable of providing the type of account 
needed for the proposed legal services funding scheme. It is 
to consideration of these regulations that we now turn. 
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National banks are required to join the Federal 
Reserve System, 20 whose members are not allowed to pay 
any interest on demand deposits: "No member bank shall, 
directly or indirectly, by any device whatsoever, pay any 
interest on any deposit which is payable on demand." 21 
National banks are corporate entities owning their existence 
to federal law, yet states can regulate national banks on the 
basis of their police power, as long as that regulation does 
not interfere with the federal function of the bank. But the 
explicit proscription of interest-bearing demand accounts 
prevents any state action creating such an account. 
It is evident that the proposed funding scheme 
if involving interest on demand accounts, could not involve 
national banks if enacted on the state level. And if the 
funding scheme were to be enacted on the federal level, an 
amendment to the banking statutes repealing the prohibi-
tion on interest-bearing demand accounts could well have 
ramifications in the finance world that would make such a 
step impractical or even undesirable. 22 
State banks are not only subject to state laws 
under which they are incorporated, but most state banks 
are also subject to federal regulations. Any state bank that 
is a member of the Federal Reserve System or that is 
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is 
subject to certain federal regulations. And those regulations 
restrict such state banks from paying interest on demand 
accounts. "No member bank of the Federal Reserve System 
shall, directly or indirectly, by any device whatsoever, pay 
any interest on any demand deposit." 23 Likewise, any 
non-member 24 bank insured by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation is precluded from paying interest on 
a demand account. 25 
Savings banks are creations of state law, yet 
they also may join the Federal Reserve System or be 
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 26 
Thus, those state savings banks that join the Federal 
Reserve System or that are F.D.I.C.-insured are subject to 
the same prohibition on interest-bearing demand accounts 
as are regulated state commercial banks. 
It thus appears that many state commercial 
banks and state savings banks would not be able to 
participate in the proposed funding scheme without a 
change in the federal regulations. This fact precludes the 
funding scheme from being enacted on the state level unless 
there are alternative methods of providing interest-bearing 
demand accounts. · 
One possible alternative concerns those state 
commercial banks and state savings banks which are not 
members of the Federal Reserve System and are not insured 
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 27 But in 
some cases there are state laws proscribing the payment of 
interest on demand accounts by state commercial banks. 
And lawyers may be reluctant to place clients' funds in 
uninsured banks since they offer less protection to their 
funds than do insured banks. 
Many states also provide by statute that saving 
banks may require anywhere from 30 to 90 days notice of 
withdrawal. 28 If such notice requirements are enforced by 
a savings bank no demand account is possible. But even if 
notice of withdrawal requirements is not enforced 29 an 
account in a savings bank seems impractical for use in the 
funding scheme. This is because there is no negotiable 
instrument by which funds in savings bank can be 
transferred. For funds to be withdrawn from a savings 
bank, the depositor or his representative must personally 
make the withdrawal. 30 This inconvenience seems to make 
the use of savings banks impractical for purposes of a 
clients' trust account. What is needed is an interest-bearing 
checking account. 
A savings bank in Massachusetts, by developing 
the Negotiable Order of Withdrawal, may have provided 
just such an account. In the same form as a check, the 
Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (also known as NOW) 
fulfills the requirements of negotiability under the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 31 When signed by the drawer and 
depositor, money is payable by the savings bank on 
demand. Yet the account is a regular savings account, 
bearing the normal rate of interest. In terms of its practical 
function, NOW constitutes an interest-bearing checking 
account. 
There are differences, however. The orders of 
withdrawal are available to the depositor on his agreement 
that they are subject to such notice requirements as may be 
adopted by the bank or the bank commissioner. 32 
Although institution of a notice requirement would damage 
the efficacy of the Negotiable Order of Withdrawal as a 
vehicle in the proposed funding scheme, it would appear 
that the market system would prevent notice of withdrawal 
from being required. Any savings bank which began 
requiring notice of withdrawal would promptly lose any 
clients' trust accounts to savings banks which did not have 
such requirements. Since a lawyer usually does not have the 
capability of predicting when he will pay out clients' 
money, withdrawal notice requirements are simply too 
restrictive for a functioning clients' trust account. 
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The Negotiable Order of Withdrawal also 
involves a service charge of fifteen cents per order. 
This would not appear to be a restrictive cost as the 
lawyer could pay it from the interest earned on the fund. 33 
The interest earned by the account minus the cost of 
maintaining the account would then be paid into the 
foundation. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held 
the Negotiable Order of Withdrawal to be legal in Consumer 
Savings Bank v. Commissioner of Banking. 34 The court 
held that Massachusetts law does not proscribe such a 
withdrawal method in savings banks and that establishment 
of withdrawal methods is a matter for the individual banks. 
The decision turned on the general wording of 
Massachusetts law which the Court held did not require the 
exclusive use of passbooks for the withdrawal of deposits 
from savings banks. Negotiable Orders of Withdrawal may 
not be legal in states where statutes require the use of a 
passbook for savings bank withdrawal. 35 
The number of financial institutions capable of 
providing the interest-bearing demand account necessary 
for the proposed funding scheme thus appears to be 
limited. National banks are precluded from paying interest 
on demand accounts as are state commercial banks and 
state savings banks which are either members of the Federal 
Reserve System or are insured by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation. This leaves only non-member, 
non-insured state commercial banks in those states which 
have no restrictions on interest being paid on demand 
accounts and non-member, non-insured state savings banks 
in those states where a Negotiable Order of Withdrawal 
would be legal. It is thus apparent that in some states 
statutory amendment of banking law will be necessary in 
conjunction with the implementation of the proposed 
funding scheme. 
There is, however, one alternative which 
requires no amendment to any banking regulation. Lawyers 
could maintain two trust accounts in a commercial bank; 
one an interest-bearing account and the other a demand 
account from which payments on behalf of clients would 
be made. Such an arrangement could require that lawyers 
audit rather closely the amount of funds in the demand 
account so that this account will always be able to meet 
any possible payment demand. 36 However, banks do have 
the capacity to make daily audits of accounts and to 
transfer funds from one account to another. It is quite 
possible that banks could be convinced to transfer funds 
from the interest-bearing account to the demand account as 
need dictates. Such an arrangement would appear to 
encounter no legal prohibitions. It is conceivable, however, 
that a court could hold that the arrangement was a sham 
and that such automatic transfer of funds created a 
prohibited interest-bearing demand account. 
Banking regulations clearly present a major 
hurdle to the implementation of the British Columbia 
funding scheme in this country. The use of two accounts in 
a commercial bank appears to be the path of least 
resistance, since no amendments to any banking regulation 
would be required. But if commercial banks fail to respond 
to the demand for the dual account arrangement or if the 
courts pierce the veil of the dual account and hold that an 
illegal interest-bearing demand account is operating, the 
problem of implementation becomes more severe. Unless 
the NOW account spreads to other states, it would then 
become necessary in most cases to amend the banking 
regulations in order to provide the necessary 
interest-bearing demand account. 
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4 The Due Process Question 
A major argument that can be advanced in 
opposition to the proposed funding scheme is of 
constitutional dimensions. It is the client's money, so why 
shouldn't the client be receiving the interest? A client's 
property is used to earn interest, and the fruits of that use 
are paid not to the client, but to the Law Foundation. 
Doesn't the proposed funding scheme constitute the taking 
of property without due process of law? 
One method of confronting the argument is to 
follow the example of the British Columbia model: 
participation in the funding scheme could be voluntary on 
the part of each client. The British Columbia statute 
stipulates that it is not to "affect any arrangement in 
writing, whenever made, between a solicitor and his client 
as to the application of the client's money or interest 
thereon; or apply to money deposited in a separate account 
for a client at interest that shall be and remain the property 
of the client." 37 Any client who so desires may make an 
arrangement with his attorney and receive the interest that 
his funds earn while they are in the clients' trust account. 
The voluntary nature of the scheme ought to answer any 
due process objections that may be advanced. 
From the initial experience under the British 
Columbia model, it seems likely that such a voluntary 
arrangement will have little effect on the manner in which 
clients' trust funds operate in this country. That is, it seems 
safe to predict that few clients who would not normally 
have separate interest-bearing accounts established would 
exercise the option to earn interest on their funds paid into 
the pooled clients' trust account of their lawyer. As has 
been mentioned previously, it is the common practice that 
corporate and individual clients who pay large sums into 
these accounts, sometimes for extended periods of time, 
usually have their money placed in separate interest-bearing 
accounts. It is the aggregate of the nominal and moderate 
amounts paid to lawyers by many clients which presently 
ends up in the non-interest-bearing demand account. Under 
the proposed funding scheme with voluntary client 
participation, it is certain that the clients who must pay in 
large sums will continue to request that the interest on 
those monies be paid to them. And on the basis of the 
British Columbia experience it seems safe to predict that 
those clients paying in nominal and moderate amounts will 
not make the necessary arrangements with their lawyers to 
effect payment to themselves of the earned interest. 38 This 
is because the interest will usually be so nominal that the 
client will not bother to make the necessary arrangements 
with his attorney, especially if they involve a degree of red 
tape, as does the British Columbia model, which requires an 
agreement in writing. For example, it means little to the 
ordinary client whether or not he receives the interest 
earned on several thousand dollars pa'id into a clients' trust 
account pursuant to a real estate contract, when that 
several thousand dollars earns very insignificant interest in 
the ten days which it is in the account. Yet it is just these 
types of transactions which when taken in the aggregate, 
yield a substantial amount of interest. 39 
To assure the voluntariness of the system, 
adequate notice must be given to the client. When a client 
pays money into a clients' trust account, he must be 
informed of his right to receive the earned interest. 
Similarly, the exercise of that right must not be so 
burdensome to the client that a court would hold the 
system to be involuntary. Presumably, a written agreement 
as provided in the British Columbia plan would suffice. 
' The due process objection becomes a critical 
problem if the client's participation is mandatory. A system 
which would make it mandatory that all interest earned on 
clients' trust accounts be paid to the Law Foundation 
would certainly meet objections that there was deprivation 
of property without due process of law. A clients' property 
is used and the fruits of that use are taken by the Law 
Foundation without the consent of the property owner. A 
client's money, while deposited in a clients' trust account, 
remains the property of the client: it is the client's money 
which is earning the interest. If that interest is taken 
without the client's consent, a strong argument that there 
has been a taking of property without due process can be 
advanced. 
One possible method of attacking the due 
process problem which arises in a mandatory scheme is to 
institute the system in the form of a tax on the bank rather 
than as a collection of earned interest from clients' funds. A 
tax would be imposed on banks on the basis of the number 
of clients' accounts serviced by the bank and the amounts 
of these accounts. Such an approach would also eliminate 
. the problems arising with respect to interest-bearing 
accounts. Yet under McCulloch v. Maryland 40 and 
progeny, states are not allowed to tax national banks unless 
expressly authorized by Congress, so the use of national 
banks would be precluded under a taxation approach. If 
enacted on the state level, the funding scheme would thus 
necessarily involve state taxation of state banks. 
Banks are recognized as quasi-public institu-
tions and thus, are subject to governmental supervision 
and even discriminatory regulation. 41 Governmental 
regulation is justified as being in the public interest but 
must meet standards of reasonableness. 42 An excise 
tax on banks on the basis of the clients' trust accounts 
serviced by a bank would appear to be reasonable 
regulation on the part of the state. 
The proposed excise tax would be a uniform 
and equal tax. All banks holding clients' trust accounts 
would be taxed on the basis of the same formula. The tax 
would be imposed at a rate equal to the rate of interest the 
account would be earning ifit was an interest-bearing 
account. 
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At the present, banks have the use of monies 
from clients' trust accounts, indeed all demand accounts, 
and pay nothing for the use of those monies. Banks have 
this free use of money as a result of governmental action, 
that is, the imposition of the prohibition against 
interest-bearing demand accounts. A tax on clients' trust 
accounts is thus a tax on a transaction which is beneficial to 
the bank because of governmental regulation. The tax does 
not prevent a bank from conducting this activity or even 
from realizing a profit on the use of the money. But the tax 
does make the bank pay for a benefit in the nature of a 
windfall, which results from regulations imposed for 
reasons other than the provision of this benefit for 
banks. 43 
The due process objection, then, does not seem 
to present a major hurdle if the participation of clients is 
voluntary, and if the notice to clients and the method by 
which clients exercise their right to receive the earned 
interest guarantees voluntariness. If participation of clients 
is mandatory, however, problems arise. While a mandatory 
scheme would probably yield more interest than a 
voluntary arrangement, the additional problems creat~d 
make the mandatory scheme undesirable. The courts could 
well find that a mandatory scheme violated due process of 
law. To overcome this objection, a mandatory scheme 
would have to be enacted in the form of a tax on banks, 
thus creating more political opposition from the banks. 
Finally, a mandatory scheme would hamper the functioning 
of clients' trust funds, for the individual and corporate 
clients' paying large sums to their attorneys could not 
afford not to earn the interest on their money. If such 
clients could not afford to use clients' trust accounts, many 
lawyers will find their practice hampered and 
inconvenienced. The result would be more opposition from 
the bar. 
5 Some Political Considerations 
Once the problems involving the mechanics of 
the funding scheme are solved and any due process hurdles 
overcome, serious political difficulties remain. It is not 
within the scope of this paper to deal at length with such 
considerations, but the problem areas will be mentioned. 
One of the major questions that will arise when 
a funding scheme such as the British Columbia plan is 
presented concerns the purposes for which the foundation 
can distribute funds. The British Columbia model provides 
that distribution of funds can occur for a variety of 
purposes: legal education, legal research, legal aid, law 
reform and the establishment, operation, and maintenance 
of law libraries. 44 Allowing such a diverse expenditure of 
funds, with that expenditure controlled by the governing 
board, the majority of which were selected by the bar 
association, would certainly lessen opposition from the 
organized bar to such a plan. 
The argument can be made that funds earned 
by the proposed plan should accrue only to the benefit of a 
legal aid organization. Indeed, it can be argued that it is not 
even necessary to establish a foundation and that earned 
interest should be paid directly to existing legal aid 
organizations. 45 But such a plan is certain to encourage 
more political opposition than the British Columbia model. 
Some lawyers view legal aid as competition and would 
oppose such a plan on grounds of self-interest. Similiarly, a 
funding scheme benefitting only legal aid programs would 
provide a focus for those who oppose legal aid on political 
or racial grounds. The British Columbia model, on the other 
hand, by permitting use of funds on a broader scale 
benefitting a larger group of people, would diffuse some of 
this opposition. 
The undisputable fact is that the statutory 
definition of the spending functions of the foundation will 
be a source of severe political conflict. Legislators may 
want to define the spending powers more precisely than 
does the British Columbia statute. Indeed, the whole 
question is raised of what limits could be placed on the use 
of these funds. Could earned interest from clients' trust 
accounts be paid to a foundation established to fund 
medical services to the poor? It seems doubtful that there 
would be any legal restraints if a legislature enacted such a 
plan. But the British Columbia plan does appear to derive 
its justification from the fact that the existing legal 
apparatus is being used to bear the cost of providing legal 
services to a greater number of people. Such action, it can 
be argued, is a mandate of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility 46 and also, in the end, will benefit the legal 
profession by introducing people to legal services who, in 
the future, will use legal services again. 
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Another aspect of the funding scheme which 
will be disputed concerns the composition of the governing 
board and the method of selection. The British Columbia 
model provides that the seven-member governing board will 
be comprised of the Attorney General, a non-lawyer 
appointed by the Attorney General, and five members of 
the Law Society {the equivalent of a bar association) 
appointed by the Benchers {the governing board of the Law 
Society). Such a selection process, if enacted in the United 
States, would prevent political control by the state 
government. The State Bar Association would be in control 
of selecting the majority of the governing board. But such a 
process contains one glaring inadequacy. It seems 
paradoxical to put a legal services funding scheme under the 
control of the organized bar, segments of which have in the 
past provided opposition to legal aid programs. Similarly, 
the executive branches of many state governments have 
been opposed to state funding of legal aid programs. 47 If 
the foundation is controlled by these two segments and a 
variety of spending functions is permitted by statute, the 
result could well be that the foundation monies will be 
spent on grants to graduate students and professors for 
research, and legal aid programs will be ignored. 
One answer to this dilemma, if the spending 
power of the foundation is not narrowed to encompass 
only legal aid, is to provide for a legal aid representative to 
be on the governing board. But this raises the same type of 
problems as do proposals for public interest representatives 
on the board of directors of a corporation. Who is qualified 
as a legal aid representative? And who would have the 
power to select such a representative? If there are some 
existing legal aid programs in a state, one possibility would 
be to give the directors of these programs power to appoint 
someone to serve on the governing board of the foundation. 
But it is evident that even if a state legislature was 
persuaded to include a legal aid representative on the 
governing board, assuring that a bona fide representative of 
legal aid is selected is not an easy task. 
One final problem area concerns the 
participation of lawyers and law firms. When the British 
Columbia plan was first enacted, participation on the part 
of lawyers was voluntary. 48 The result was about thirty per 
cent participation. 49 As of November 20, 1972, 
participation became mandatory for lawyers. While there 
would seem to be no due process problems with a 
mandatory system of participation on the part of 
lawyers, 50 such a system is more likely to evoke opposition 
from the organized bar than would a voluntary system. 
1 See Kantor, Lobbying for Legal 
Services: An Interview with Michael 
Kantor, 3 Yale Review of Law and 
Social Action 19 (1972). 
2 See Soler, Mark, Legal Assistance is 
Dying in New Haven, 3 Yale Review of 
Law and Social Action 9 (1972), and 
Bennett and Cruz, California Rural 
Legal Assistance (CRLA): Survival of a 
Poverty Law Practice, 1 Chicano Law 
Review 1 (1972). 




71E. Upon their appointment as 
provided in section 71F, the members 
are constituted a corporation with the 
name "Law Foundation" (hereinafter 
caJled the "foundation"), and the 
foundation may acquire, hold; 
mortgage, dispose of, and otherwise deal 
with real and personal property for the 
purposes of the foundation. 
Board of 
Governors. 
71F. (1) The foundation shall be 
administered by a Board of Governors 
(hereinafter caJled the "board") 
comprising seven members, of whom 
(a) one shall be the Attorney-General 
or his appointee; and 
(b) one shall be a person, not a member 
of the Society; appointed to the board 
by the Attorney-General; and 
(c) five shall be members of the Society 
appointed by the Benchers. 
(2) Members of the board other than the 
Attorney-General shaJI hold office for 
two years or until their successors are 
appointed. 
(3) Of the members referred to in clause 
(c) of subsection (1), one shaJI, by the 
instrument of his appointment, be 
appointed as chairman of the board. 
(4) Where a vacancy occurs in the office 
of a member, the person or body by 
whom he was appointed may appoint to 
the vacant office any person eligible to 
be appointed to that office by that 
person or body under subsection (1), 
and the person so appointed shall hold 
office for the residue of the term for 
which he is appointed, or until his 
successor is appointed. 
(5) A quorum of the board shall consist 
of four members thereof. 
(6) The continuing members of the 
board may act notwithstanding any 
vacancy in the board. 
(7) No act done by the authority of the 
board shall be invalid.in consequence of 
any defect that is afterwards discovered 
in the appointment of the members. 
(8) An appointed member of the board 
may resign from office upon giving one 
month's notice in writing to the board 
of his intention to do so, and his 
resignation shall take effect upon the 
expiration of the notice, or upon its 
earlier acceptance by the board. 
(9) The office of an appointed member 
of the board shall be vacated if 
(a) he ceases to hold the qualifications 
necessary for his appointment; or 
(b) he becomes a mentally disordered 
person; or 
(c) he becomes bankrupt. 
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71G. (1) The purpose of the foundation 
is to establish and maintain a fund to be 
used for the purposes of legal education, 
legal research, legal aid, law reform, and 
the establishment, operation, and 
maintenance of law libraries. 
(2) The board shall apply, and cause to 
be applied, the funds of the foundation, 
in.such manner as the board may decide, 
for the purposes of the foundation. 
(3) No part of the income of the 
foundation shall be payable to or 
otherwise available for the personal 
benefit of any member of the board of 
the foundation, or of the Law Society 
of British Columbia or any member 
thereof. 
(4) The funds of the foundation shall 
consist of all sums paid to the 
foundation by solicitors as provided in 
section 711, interest accruing from 
investment of the funds of the 
foundation, and any other moneys 
received by the foundation. 
(5) There shall be paid out of the funds 
of the foundation the costs, charges, and 
expenses involved in the administration 
of the foundation, and the costs, 
charges, and expenses incurred by the 
board in carrying out the purposes of 
the foundation. 
(6) All moneys of the foundation shall, 
pending investment or application in 
accordance with this section, bll paid 
into a bank in the Province to the credit 
of a separate account to be called the 
"Law Foundation Account," and that 
account shall be used for the purposes 
of the foundation. 
(7) Any moneys that are not 
immediately required for the purposes 
of the foundation may be invested in 
the name of the foundation by the 
board in any manner in which trustees 
are authorized to invest trust funds, if 
the investments are in all other respects 
reasonable and proper. 
(8) The accounts of the foundation shall 
be audited annually by a chartered 
accountant appointed for the purpose 
by the Benchers. 
71H. The board may, subject to. the 
provisions of this Act, make by-laws for 
purposes relating to the affairs, business, 
property, and objects of the foundation, 
and, without limiting the generality of 
the foregoing, may make by-laws 
regarding 
(a) the number and designation of 
officers of the foundation; 
(b) the appointment of and terms of 
office of officers of the foundation and 
all matters relating to their offices; 
(c) the resignation or removal from 
office of officers of the foundation; 
(d) the number and designations of 
employees of the foundation other than 
officers, and their terms and conditions 
of employment; 
(e) the remuneration, if any, of officers 
and employees of the foundation; and 
(f) the operation of the Law Foundation 
Account. 
711. (1) A solicitor shall not be liable, 
by virtue of the relation between 
solicitor and client or by virtue of the 
relation between the solicitor as trustee 
and a cestui que trust, to account to any 
client for interest received by the 
solicitor or moneys deposited in a bank 
or a trust company being moneys 
received or held for or on account of his 
clients generally. 
(2) A solicitor who is credited by a bank 
or trust company with interest on 
moneys received or held for or on 
account of clients generally shall be 
deemed to hold the interest in trust for 
the foundation, and shall remit the 
interest to the foundation, in 
accordance with the rules of the 
Society, and the Society shall make 
rules to ensure that all interest so 
credited to the solicitor be paid to the 
foundation. 
(3) Nothing in this section or in the 
rules made pursuant to this section shall 
(a) affect any arrangement in writing, 
whenever made, between a solicitor and 
his client as to the application of the 
client's money or interest thereon; or 
(b) apply to money deposited in a 
separate account for a client at interest 
that shall be and remain the property of 
the client. 
4 This difference is the result of the 
differing banking regulations in effect in 
the United States and British Columbia. 
These regulations will be discussed in 
part III of the Article. 
5 § 71 E. supra. 
6 § 71 1(3) (a) & (b), supra. 
7 § 71 I (1), supra. 
8 The statute does not provide a means to 
assure that attorneys pay the interest 
earned to the foundation. Rather, the 
statute places the responsibility for 
devising such a plan on the Law Society 
(the British Columbia equivalent of the 
Bar Association). 
9 § 71 F.(l),supra. 
10 § 71 G (1), supra. 
.11 §11G(2),supra. 
12 § 71 H, supra. 
13 Annual Report, 1972, of the Law 
Foundation of British Columbia. Also,. 
letter to the author from Mr. Frank 
Mackzo, Director of Legal Aid Society 
of British Columbia. 
14 The reason for the 1972 amendment 
requiring that all clients' funds held by a 
solicitor be placed in an interest bearing 
account, is because many solicitors, 
particularly those dependent upon 
business from banks, had feared a loss of 
that business would result if they 
deposited clients' funds in interest 
bearing accounts. This competitive 
incentive has now been eliminated and 
the scheme is mandatory as far as 
attorney's use of interest bearing 
accounts is concerned. 
15 Ethical Consideration 9-5 and 
Disciplinary Rule 9-102(a), Code of 
Professional Responsibility. 
16 Cady, Canons to the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, 2 Conn. Law 
Review 222, 248. 
17 Baum, Banking in Canada, 59 George-
town Law Review, 1129 (1970-71). 
18 Id. 
19 Bank Act, Vol. 1, Revised Statutes of 
Canada (1970), Chapter B-1, § 75 
(l)(e). 
20 12 u.s.c. § 282. 
21 12 C.F.R. § 371a. 
22 If commercial banks provided interest-
bearing demand accounts, the competi-
tive balance between savings banks and 
commercial banks would be altered. 
More dollars would flow from savings 
banks to the commercial banks because 
of their increased convenience. Yet the 
money that savings banks earn from 
savings accounts helps subsidize the 
interest rate charged on home mortgage 
loans. A decrease in revenue from 
savings accounts will result in an 
increased interest rate on those loans. 
23 12 C.F.R. § 217.2. 
24 Non-member bank means non-member 
of the Federal Reserve System. 
25 12 C.F.R. § 392.2. 
26 12 C.F.R. § 208.1. Mutual savings 
banks are included as well as savings 
banks with capital stock. 
27 Symposium on Banking Regulation, 31 
Law and Contemporary Problems, 635, 
640 (1966). At the end of 1965, there 
were only 221 state commercial banks 
uninsured by F.D.I.C. 
28 A summary of the banking law in the 
various states is found in J. Fonseca, 
Encyclopedia of Banking Law. Savings 
banks also often have limits on the 
amount of deposit that can be made in a 
savings account. But the maximum 
amount allowed should seldom prove to 
be a problem. 
29 From interviews with officials associated 
with savings banks, it seems to be the 
general practice that notice of withdraw-
al requirements are never enforced. 
30 It also appears to be the general rule 
that the by-laws of a savings bank 
require that a passbook be presenteq 
when withdrawals occur. This require-
ment does not appear to be strictly 
enforced in practice, but if enforced, 
would con~titute additional incon-
venience. 
31 See Uniform Commercial Code, 
§ 3-104(1). See also Consumers Savings 
Bank v. Commissioner of Banks, 282 
N.E.2d 146 (1972). 
32 This possibility may exempt the account 
from technically being considered a 
demand account. Thus, even a state 
savings bank which is a member of the 
Federal Reserve System or is insured by 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion may be able to provide such an 
account. 
33 This would appear to be precisely the 
situation described in Opinion# 991, 
discussed in section II. Yet it can argued 
that the attorney is incurring the .cost of 
maintaining this account solely as a 
result of legislative activity. That is, this 
is not an ordinary operation expense, 
but is a legislatively created cost. There 
are thus no ethical problems with having 
the proceeds of the account pay for the 
maintenance of the account. 
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34 282 N.E.2d 416 (1972). 
35 See R. Fonseca, Encyclopedia of 
Banking Law, supra note 24 for relevant 
laws in the various states. 
36 If the attorney is responsible for 
auditing the accounts and maintaining 
adequate funds in the demand account, 
it is likely that most attorneys would 
keep a large sum in the demand account, 
which would result in less interest being 
earned in the interest-bearing account. 
37 § 71 I (3)(a), supra. 
38 Phone conversation with Frank Maczko, 
Director of the Legal Aid Society of 
British Columbia,. 
39 It should be made clear at this point 
that the proposed funding scheme, as it 
has been discussed in this paper, has its 
greatest impact on banks. Those few 
clients who now have their funds placed 
in separate accounts will continue to 
have that option. Those clients whose 
funds will be earning interest for the law 
foundation are not now receiving any 
interest on their money paid into the 
clients' trust account. But the banks, 
which now have use of these funds and 
are required to pay no interest, must, 
under the proposed funding scheme, pay 
for the use of those funds. Banks 
therefore could well provide one of the 
main sources of opposition to this plan. 
40 McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S., 316 
(1819). The Court of Appeals of New 
Mexico, however, has departed from this 
tradition. In 1st National Bank of Santa 
Fe v. Commissioner, 80 N.M. 699, 460 
P.2d 64 (1969), the court upheld a state 
tax on fees received by a national bank 
for data processing services performed 
for other banks. The court reasoned that 
the data processing services are outside 
the scope of the banking powers 
specified in 12 U.S.C. § 24 and therefore 
the receipts are not immune under 12 
U.S.C.§548. It is doubtful, however, 
that a similar rationale could be applied 
here, for there is little about a bank's 
involvement with clients' trust funds 
which is outside the scope of banking 
powers. Daily, Taxation of National 
Banks: A Novel Approach in the New 
Mexico Courts, 10 Natural Resources 
Law Journal 615 (1970). 
41 Rainey v. Michel, 6 Cal. 2d 259, 57 P.2d 
932. See also 111 ALR 141. 
42 Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Federal 
Reserve Bank, 262 U.S. 649 and Little 
v. American State Bank, 263 Mich. 645, 
249 N.W. 22 (1933). 
43 Since there are constitutional provisions· 
applicable to taxes, it is sometimes 
desirable to define a particular 
imposition as a fee. However, a fee 
charged for the sole purpose of raising 
revenue cannot escape constitutional 
requirements on taxes. Murdock v. 
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
44 § 71 G (1), supra. 
45 Such a scheme would not appear to 
affect the tax exempt status of a legal 
aid association. A legal aid association, 
e.g., New Haven Legal Assistance, is 
exempt as a charitable institution under 
§ 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code. 
Receiving state funding is permissible 
for a charitable institution. Funding 
under the proposed method, either as a 
tax or as a collection of interest, would 
appear to be state funding since the 
capital is both raised and allocated on 
the basis of a procedure specifically 
authorized by statute. 
This also raises the question of tax 
considerations if the Law Foundation is 
used in the funding scheme. If the 
method of raising capital is held to be 
state funding, the Law Foundation 
would not qualify as a private founda-
tion under §509 (a) (1). It would, 
however, appear to qualify as a 
charitable institution under § 501 (c) 
(3). If a legal aid association receives 
income from a charitable institution, 
here the foundation, its own exempt 
status as a charitable institution is not 
affected. 
46 Canon 2 of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility: "A lawyer should assist 
the legal profession in fulfilling its duty 
to make legal counsel available." 
47 Supra, n. 2. 
48 Phone conversation with Frank Maczko, 
Director of the Legal Aid Society of 
British Columbia. 
49 Phone conversation with Maczko, supra. 
SO No property of a lawyer is involved 
here. Mandatory participation seems to 
be permissible state regulation. 
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